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An Unfinished Project: John Courtney Murray, 
Religious Freedom, and Unresolved Tensions in 
Contemporary American Society 
Miguel H. Díaz, PhD* 
Religious freedom has re-emerged as a controversial issue in the courts, 
in the Church, and in the public square in the United States. This essay 
examines the groundbreaking contribution that John Courtney Murray, SJ 
made to bring about a paradigm shift in Roman Catholic teaching on 
religious freedom. This shift can be traced to the Church’s transitioning from 
the view that “error has no rights” to only people—not ideas—have rights. 
The essay underscores Murray’s focus on human conscience and addresses 
tensions that have emerged in the United States between voices that affirm 
the right to religious freedom and those that affirm other fundamental human 
rights. The essay proposes the adoption of an integral ecology of human 
rights built upon an option for the legally and religiously marginalized. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The figure of John Courtney Murray, SJ (1904–1967) looms large in 
discussions of religious freedom and, in particular, when addressing the 
paradigm shift that occurred in Roman Catholicism after the 1965 release 
of Dignitatis Humanae.1 This central document of the Second Vatican 
 
* The John Courtney Murray University Chair in Public Service at Loyola University Chicago, 
Ambassador to Holy See, Ret. 
1. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanae, Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dec. 7, 1965), 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207 
_dignitatis-humanae_en.html. 
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Council changed the way the Church understood its relationship with a 
world characterized by an increasing religious and cultural pluralism.2 As 
an American and as a Jesuit, Murray tapped into the complex and 
manifold tradition of natural law as a way to reflect upon the American 
consensus.3 For Murray, the cornerstone of this consensus within 
American democracy was the moral vision that informed the thoughts of 
our nation’s founders. Murray saw this moral vision as stemming from a 
religiously informed consciousness that affirmed the transcendent rights 
of human persons. But this consensus, Murray would argue, cannot be 
taken for granted. It is an unfinished project that requires ongoing 
reasoned conversations and constructive public dialogue for the sake of 
the survival of our democracy. 
This American consensus, especially around issues related to the 
separation of Church from state, was decisive in Murray’s efforts to 
precipitate change in the Catholic Church’s understanding on religious 
freedom.4 In spite of the opposition that Murray faced and having been 
even silenced by some Church authorities, Dignitatis Humanae witnessed 
the triumph of his relentless efforts to draw from the American model of 
separating Church and state and from the constitutional affirmation of 
inalienable human rights and freedoms.5 In parsing the implications of 
 
2. Unless otherwise noted, due to my focus on John Courtney Murray’s teaching on religious 
freedom, the term “Church” will be used exclusively in this article in reference to the Roman 
Catholic Church. 
3. See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE 
AMERICAN PROPOSITION 115–22, 249–300 (3d ed. 2005) (recognizing that even though natural law 
exists and is indestructible, it is not acknowledged, and thus there is no elaboration of public 
consensus based on it). It is worth citing what prominent Catholic moral theologian Charles E. 
Curran has noted with respect to “natural law.” As Curran argues, “Natural Law remains a very 
ambiguous term.” Oftentimes the term “natural” is distinguished from supernatural in a way that 
does not sufficiently opt for an integral and incarnational approach to the presence of God in human 
history. Moreover, while the concept of natural law is often used by Catholic thinkers in connection 
with Thomas Aquinas, the fact is that the term “nature had over twenty different meanings in 
Catholic thinking before Thomas Aquinas.” Curran also points out that the term “law” is ambiguous 
because for most modern readers it carries an overly legalistic connotation, “whereas for Thomas 
law was an ordering of reason.” To summarize Curran’s arguments on natural law:  
natural law is a deliberative ethic which arrives at decision not primarily by the 
application of laws, but by the deliberation of reason. . . . Natural law in the history of 
thought does not refer to a monolithic theory, but tends to be a more generic term which 
includes a number of different approaches to moral problems. There is no such thing as 
the natural law as a monolithic philosophical system with an agreed upon body of ethical 
content existing from the beginning of time. 
See Charles E. Curran, Natural Law in Moral Theology, in READINGS IN MORAL THEOLOGY NO. 
7: NATURAL LAW AND THEOLOGY 247, 253–54, (Charles E. Curran & Richard A. McCormick 
eds., 1991). 
4. See generally MURRAY, supra note 3. 
5. For a historical overview of the Roman Catholic Church’s teaching on religious freedom and 
Murray’s struggle, condemnation, and vindication, see BARRY HUDOCK, STRUGGLE, 
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the American consensus for the Church’s teaching on religious freedom, 
Murray’s most lasting contribution, and certainly most relevant argument 
for our time, is his affirmation of “the fundamental inviolability of human 
freedom and the supremacy of conscience, even an ill-informed 
conscience.”6 
 Religious freedom has re-emerged as a key and highly controversial 
issue within our increasingly polarized society. Within a pluralistic and 
religiously diverse global reality, our American public consensus faces 
new challenges. In this sense, Murray’s voice resonates with the signs of 
our times.7 Today, defending religious freedom—this constitutional and 
most basic of human rights—demands that we consider anew questions 
of religious freedom, ever so mindful of the relationship this right carries 
with respect to other human rights. We must make sure that, under the 
banner of religious freedom, no one person or group of persons engages 
in unlawful discrimination. 
Within America’s democratic legislative system, proponents and 
opponents of various laws and policies continue to invoke the protections 
afforded to religious principles and beliefs, seeking the equilibrium 
Murray dubbed public order. Critically engaging the role of religion 
within the public square has never been a more necessary task. From 
cake-baking to cage-making, religion and the First Amendment are at the 
heart of national debates and legal cases that affect not only the right of 
religious expression for millions of documented and undocumented 
“Americans,” but also issues of public peace, public morality, and 
justice.8 As the weight of these issues carry them as far as the Supreme 
 
COMMENDATION, VINDICATION: JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY’S JOURNEY TOWARD VATICAN II 
(2015). See also John Coleman, The Achievement of Religious Freedom, 24 U.S. CATH. HISTORIAN 
21, 21–32 (discussing the identities of the “principal opposing actors or contending parties who 
helped to make Dignitatis the most deeply contested document of Vatican II,” the processes through 
which the document eventuated and how those processes effected what it ultimately said, and the 
reasons the document is frequently considered a part of Catholic social teaching); Joseph A. 
Komonchak, The American Contribution to Dignitatis Humanae: The Role of John Courtney 
Murray, S.J., 24 U.S. CATH. HISTORIAN 1, 1–20 (explaining Murray’s role in “the Catholic doctrine 
of religious freedom”); Pietro Pavan, Declaration on Religious Feeedom, in 4 COMMENTARY ON 
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 49–86 (Herbert Vorgrimler ed., Hilda Graef, W.J. O’Hara, & 
Ronald Walls trans., 1975) (explaining the schematic structure of the Constitution “De Ecclesia”). 
6. ROBERT MCCLORY, FAITHFUL DISSENTERS: STORIES OF MEN AND WOMEN WHO LOVED 
AND CHANGED THE CHURCH 12 (2000). 
7. See John F. Quinn, The Enduring Influence of We Hold These Truths, 16 CATH. SOC. SCI. 
REV. 73, 73–84 (2011) (explaining the lasting effect of Murray’s teachings). 
8. Murray argued that the state is primarily responsible for public order, and he limited the 
goods that could be achieved by the power of the state to three: public peace, public morality (by 
which he understood commonly accepted moral standards), and justice. “The public order thus 
becomes the criterion which controls and justifies the intervention of the state in all matters 
including the area of religion.” See CHARLES E. CURRAN, AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIAL ETHICS: 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY APPROACHES 197 (1982) (describing that a “principle in Murray’s 
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Court, and as friends and foes of religion weaponize religious freedom 
within the public square, Murray’s advice to Catholics is as relevant today 
as it was when he first offered it in 1960.9 As he suggests, the importance 
of affirming religious freedom must be understood as a moral 
commitment to foster peace and public order within the pluralistic 
American democracy: 
The American Catholic is on good ground when he refuses to make an 
ideological idol out of religious freedom and separation of church and 
state, when he refuses to “believe” in them as articles of faith. He takes 
the highest ground available in this matter of the relations between 
religion and government when he asserts that his commitment to the 
religion clauses of the Constitution is a moral commitment to them as 
articles of peace in a pluralist society.10 
Murray’s careful distinction between faith and politics and his 
invitation to Catholics to commit to hold the government responsible for 
maintaining public order and peace within our pluralistic American 
society carries many implications when considering the widespread 
social experience of polarization and cultural wars at this moment in 
American history. As a Roman Catholic, Murray reflected the Catholic 
analogical imagination’s attempt to reject polarizing positions, especially 
seeking a rapprochement between Catholicism and American 
democracy, between faith and reason, between the body of Christ and 
body politic, and, ultimately, between believer and citizen.11 As a Jesuit, 
he reflected a religious tradition steeped in the practice of discerning 
God’s presence in ordinary daily living, embracing the goodness of the 
world, but also distinguishing through holy indifference, God from 
anyone or anything that dared to take the place of God.12 Because of this, 
Murray called upon government not to interfere in religious matters, 
which laid outside its competency.13 
 
understanding of the constitutional government is the distinction between the common good and 
the public order”). 
9. See generally MURRAY, supra note 3. 
10. Id. at 86 (emphasis added). See CURRAN, supra note 8, at 217 (describing religious liberty 
as a “social necessity” necessary for peace and civil accord in a “religiously pluralistic society”). 
11. See generally DAVID TRACY, THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION: CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 
AND THE CULTURE OF PLURALISM (1981) (identifying the difference between analogical and other 
viewpoints of faith by examining the culture of pluralism and the main differences in Christian 
theological doctrines). 
12. See collected essays by Michael J. Schuck, Mark Williams, Leon Hooper & Thomas 
Hughson, in FINDING GOD IN ALL THINGS: CELEBRATING BERNARD LONERGAN, JOHN 
COURTNEY MURRAY, AND KARL RAHNER 83–124 (Mark Bosco & David Stagaman eds., 2007) 
(discussing “the American stories Murray lived within as he conducted his research and writing” 
and suggesting their “bearing on Murray’s scholarship, particularly his notions of freedom and 
truth”). 
13. Id. 
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In this Article, I will offer a brief overview of Murray’s ideas 
connected to religious freedom and pose some questions regarding the 
ongoing realization of this unfinished project as new questions and 
challenges arise. First, I will briefly discuss Murray’s arguments in 
relation to the American consensus, which he lamented no longer existed 
and was in need of renewal.14 Murray’s reasoned historical approach 
remains relevant as we seek public consensus in defending religious 
freedom while also equally upholding a plurality of other fundamental 
human rights. Second, I will summarize Murray’s notion of religious 
freedom, highlighting the place that individual conscience exercises in 
his thought. Third, I will conclude with some observations on current 
unresolved questions within the United States related to religious 
freedom, underscoring the unfinished nature of this project and the need 
to revisit the complexity of this fundamental constitutional right. I will 
argue that in light of recent developments since the late 1960s in the 
Church, any effort to advance religious freedom and achieve consensus 
in the service of public order must address the option for and the rights 
of marginalized persons and communities. 
Respect for the human dignity and conscience of oppressed and 
marginalized communities within the Church and society, coupled with 
defending religious freedom of all persons, is the litmus test to reject what 
Pope Francis has called “the globalization of human indifference” and the 
surest road toward an integral ecology of human rights.15 Today, we must 
engage one another in order to reach a new American consensus, mindful 
of the fundamental value of religious freedom, but also aware of a 
growing global consciousness that has been birthed as a result of the 
irruption of various oppressed and marginalized subjects into history. In 
the spirit of Murray’s groundbreaking efforts, we must honor and protect, 
against any form of religious or social external coercion, the individual 
and communal religious convictions of these subjects, their theological 
and reasoned approaches to individual and socio-political experiences, 
and their God-given dignity and constitutional rights. 
 
14. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 93–94. 
15. One of the earliest uses of the term “globalization of human indifference” was in the homily 
Pope Francis gave in Lampedusa Island, comparable to our Ellis Island. The pope characterized the 
lack of justice and care for immigrants as reflecting this global indifference. See Pope Francis, 
Homily at “Arena” Sports Camp, Salina Quarter (July 8, 2013), https://w2.vatican.va/ 
content/francesco/en/homilies/2013/documents/papa-francesco_20130708_omelia-
lampedusa.html (asking “forgiveness for those who by their decisions on the global level have 
created situations that lead to” the tragic deaths of individuals attempting to circumvent the closed 
borders of neighboring countries). 
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I.  JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY AND THE AMERICAN CONSENSUS 
In a series of essays grouped under “the American proposition,” 
Murray lays out his arguments regarding how to achieve unity within an 
American pluralistic society. Murray makes the case for constructing “a 
new act of intellectual affirmation, comparable to those which launched 
the American constitutional commonwealth, that will newly put us in 
possession of the public philosophy, the basic consensus that we need.”16 
In advocating for a recipe for this public consensus, Murray relies heavily 
on select basic principles of natural law: (1) human persons are intelligent 
creatures; (2) reality is intelligible; and (3) because reality can be 
rationally understood, human persons have an ethical obligation to act or 
abstain from action for the sake of the common good.17 
Murray follows Thomas Aquinas who argued that “[s]ince a rational 
soul is the proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination 
to act according to reason; and this is to act according to virtue.”18 Of 
course, Murray is aware that the use of reason in and of itself does not 
guarantee virtue.19 Moreover, Murray is clear that while this capacity to 
reason and reach for good is part of the permanent structure in the human 
person, the human person is never an abstract and ahistorical essence.20 
Much scholarly debate surrounds Murray’s approach to natural law, 
especially the question of whether his methodology sufficiently and 
consistently incorporated historical consciousness into consideration.21 
Critics of Murray may see echoes of the Roman lawyer Ulpian in his 
interpretation of natural law and what at times seems to be a failure to 
 
16. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 93. 
17. Id. at 111–12. 
18. Id. at 113. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt. I-II, q. 93, art. 3 (1485) 
(arguing “every law is derived from the eternal law”). 
19. For instance, Murray argues that in wiser and more honest persons the dynamism to act 
according to reason and virtue “is more fully released and more purified.” MURRAY, supra note 3, 
at 119. 
20. Id. at 114. See MIGUEL H. DÍAZ, ON BEING HUMAN: U.S. HISPANIC AND RAHNERIAN 
PERSPECTIVES 79–110 (2001) for a discussion on the dynamic, mutable, historical, and relational 
nature of human persons. 
21. Leon Hooper has persuasively traced the shift that occurs in Murray’s understanding of 
natural law from an ahistorical perspective to one that takes history more seriously into account: 
In [essay] 1945b, natural law is an a-historical, a-social, complete body of general truth 
statements. By [essay] 1950a, Murray recognized some movement in the tertiary 
principles of natural law. By his 1958a [essay], he called for a refounding of America’s 
constitutionalism on critical, not naïve, natural law premises, and in Chapters 3 and 4 he 
fully recognized the essentially social component of natural law affirmations. 
Leon Hooper, The Theological Sources of John Courtney Murray’s Ethics, in JOHN COURTNEY 
MURRAY & THE GROWTH OF TRADITION 106, 118 (J. Leon Hooper & Todd David Whitmore eds., 
1996). 
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fully integrate issues related to faith and issues related to public order.22 
Still, others have pointed to Murray’s embrace of an approach that moves 
away from abstract natural law tradition, one that pays more attention to 
historical consciousness and the “exigences” of human persons.23 
Notwithstanding these varying traditions of interpretation to his thought, 
the fact remains that Murray comes to understand the American 
consensus as something that should not be simply taken for granted, but 
rather embraced as a historical project. As such, this consensus entails an 
ongoing process that needs to be actualized in accordance with the nature 
of human persons as both rational and as historical creatures.24 The role 
of reason, exercised within (and not outside) historical contexts, remains 
indispensable to this process. Thus, Murray argues: 
But history, as any history book shows, does change what I have called 
the human reality. It evokes situations that never happened before. It 
calls into being relationships that had not existed. It involves human life 
in an increasing multitude of institutions of all kinds, which proliferate 
in response to new human needs and desires, as well as in consequence 
of the creative possibilities that are inexhaustibly resident in human 
freedom. . . . In a word, it has been abundantly proved in history that 
the nature of man is a historical nature. “The nature of man is 
susceptible of change,” St. Thomas repeatedly states. History 
continually changes the community of mankind and alters the modes of 
communication between man and man, as these take form “through 
external acts,” as St. Thomas says. In this sense, the nature of man 
changes in history, for better or for worse; at the same time that the 
fundamental structure of human nature, and the essential destinies of 
the human person, remain untouched and intact.25 
 
22. Ulpian was a third-century Roman lawyer who, as some have argued, has left a lasting 
influence on natural law proponents, including Thomas Aquinas. Curran argues that  
Ulpian’s understanding of the natural law logically leads to disastrous consequences in 
anthropology. The distinction between two parts in humans—that which is common to 
humans and all the animals, and that which is proper to humans—results in a two-layer 
version of human beings. A top layer of rationality is merely added to an already 
constituted bottom layer of animality. The union between the two layers is merely 
extrinsic—the one lies on top of the other. The animal layer retains its own finalities and 
tendencies, independent of the demands of rationality. Thus the individual may not 
interfere in the animal processes and finalities. Note that the results of such an 
anthropology are most evident in the area of sexuality. 
Curran, supra note 3, at 257. 
23. See Todd David Whitmore, Immunity or Empowerment?, in JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY & 
THE GROWTH OF TRADITION, supra note 21, at 149, 150–51 (“From 1964 on, Murray attempts to 
ground religious freedom less on perduring factors of human nature—though the emphasis on such 
factors remains in the background—and more on what he calls the ‘exigences’ of the human person 
at the present stage of human history.”). 
24. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 87–122. 
25. Id. at 114. 
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Later in this Article, I will return to this argument regarding the 
historical nature of human persons, the use of reason, and their relevance 
for addressing contemporary issues related to religious freedom. It 
suffices for now to underscore that this twofold nature of the human being 
as a rational and historical creature are essential ingredients upon which 
to build public consensus not as a matter of fact, but as Murray argued, 
as a matter of need for the sake of the public good.26 Murray maintained 
that there was “need for a new moral act of purpose and a new act of 
intellectual affirmation, comparable to those which launched the 
American constitutional commonwealth, that will newly put us in 
possession of the public philosophy, the basic consensus that we need.”27 
As I will argue shortly, the polarization we are experiencing surrounding 
issues of religious freedom and discrimination call for reasoned 
approaches in service to peace and public order. Polarization reflects the 
failure to integrate human differences, including religious diversity. The 
ancient question of reconciling the one with the many is certainly a 
central question in Murray’s writings, and remains relevant today. 
Murray correlates the constitutional affirmation of religious freedom 
with the need to keep peace in a society comprised of religious pluralism. 
He devotes much effort to commenting on the American motto, e pluribus 
unum—one out of many—and relating this motto to issues of religious 
diversity and public consensus. In so doing, he strongly advocates that 
“the public consensus, on which civil unity is ultimately based, must 
permit to the differing communities the full integrity of their own 
religious convictions.”28 But one cannot emphasize enough that pluralism 
as Murray suggests, whether religiously or culturally engendered, is the 
precondition to realize unity. Indeed, unity is not to be equated with 
sameness, as is often the case in efforts to construct the common good. 
Unity that authentically builds the common good must be understood as 
the ability of any society to subsist in human differences. Echoing 
Christian theological arguments related to the very nature of God as one 
and triune (a God who subsists in interpersonal differences as Father, 
Son, and Spirit), Murray argues that we are made one American society 
through “subsisting amid multiple pluralisms.”29 In this sense, oneness, 
 
26. Id. at 93–94. 
27. Id. at 93. 
28. Id. at 59. For Murray’s arguments concerning historical reasons for the constitutional basis 
of our American religious plurality as a basis for peace, see id. at 68–74.  
29. Id. at 44; see Joseph A. Komonchak, John Courtney Murray and the Redemption of History: 
Natural Law and Theology, in JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY & THE GROWTH OF TRADITION, supra 
note 21, at 60, 63–65 (describing Murray’s specific appeal to Trinitarian theology in his effort to 
reject both liberal individualism and various forms of collectivism, like Bolshevism, Nazism, and 
Fascism). As a fruitful theological point of contact, the reader should note how Murray’s arguments 
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whether in relation to divine or human life, is not about creating sameness 
and melting away human differences. Nor does oneness precede or stand 
above pluralism. As the American motto, e pluribus unum, clearly 
suggests, pluralism is constitutive of unity. A plurality of views, 
arguments, and experiences, Murray would concur, is a necessary feature 
to the health of our American democracy. Pluralism is the sine qua non 
of reaching public consensus. 
Consistent with his understanding of human persons as rational and 
historical creatures, Murray offers some reflections that describe the 
origin, nature, and purpose of the kind of consensus he envisions within 
this pluralistic American society.30 Murray squarely places consensus as 
a historical process and not as a fait accompli. It is “doctrine—not, 
however, in the sense of Platonic dogma, but in the sense that the word 
carries when used by a lawyer or by a military strategist.”31 It is not a 
finished product. Like Catholic doctrine itself, it is “not a finished, but a 
developing, body of doctrine” that does not contain everything there is to 
know at any given moment in history, but constantly incorporates new 
insights and experiences.32 As such, consensus is subject to ongoing 
reexamination, criticism, and revision. At the same time, this consensus 
is not unguided. It draws from a shared wealth of insights, thoughts, 
wisdom, and experiences.33 
While Murray affirms the relation between public consensus and 
public opinion, he cautions against equating the two. He characterizes 
public opinion as the “shorthand” phrase that expresses communally 
 
echo similar arguments that have been made in reconciling unity and diversity in the area of 
ecclesiology and with respect to the doctrine of God. For instance, in a now well-known piece, 
Cardinal Walter Kasper argued:  
The one church of Jesus Christ exists in and from the local churches. It exists, therefore, 
in each local church; it is present there especially in the celebration of the Eucharist. It 
follows that there can be no local church in isolation, for its own sake, but only in 
communion with all other local churches.  
Walter Kasper, On the Church—A Friendly Reply to Cardinal Ratzinger, AMERICA (Apr. 23, 
2001), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20050206035736/http:// 
www.americamagazine.org/gettext.cfm?articleTypeID=1&textID=1569&issueID=333. For 
similar arguments related to the doctrine of God, see JOHN D. ZIZIOULAS, BEING AS 
COMMUNION: STUDIES IN PERSONHOOD AND THE CHURCH 27–65 (1985). 
30. In the arguments that follow regarding the origins, nature, and purpose of public consensus, 
I rely on and paraphrase MURRAY, supra note 3, at 102–09. Of particular interest is Murray’s 
critical conversation with and appropriation of ADOLF A. BERLE JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 
(1959). As such, Murray’s arguments on public consensus reflect Berle’s economic 
presuppositions. That said, it is clear that his arguments on how to reach public consensus carry 
wider implications, especially within our contemporary American context of polarization. 
31. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 108. 
32. Id. at 105. 
33. Id. 
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reached decisions stemming from “unstated but very real premises.”34 
Consensus refers to the acceptance of these premises that have come into 
communal consciousness.35 And the primary task of developing this 
consensus, the tribunal of accountability, belongs collectively to 
“university professors, the reasoned opinions of specialists, the 
statements of responsible journalists, and at times the solid 
pronouncements of respected politicians.”36 Murray argues that, within 
our democracy, this public consensus is the “final arbiter” that acts as a 
checking mechanism against any abuse of power.37 Public consensus can 
draw from “settled principles of law” but also “the capacity to criticize 
that law.”38 Finally, Murray maintains that this public consensus is not 
an ideology but rather a living process of tapping into communal 
consciousness in light of remaining in close relation to concrete human 
experiences.39 
To then summarize Murray’s dynamic concept of public consensus, 
first and foremost, consensus is the child of thoughtful human reasoning 
that emerges within history. It is a process that must be revisited 
repeatedly in light of new questions and new experiences. Consensus 
must be built and developed, tapping into the ordinary, common, and 
shared wisdom of “We the People” of these United States, and also upon 
the wisdom that can be derived from a wide range of experts on any given 
social challenge. Finally, consensus acts as a check and balance for our 
democracy against any abuse of power, especially against any effort that 
undermines the ongoing American project to build oneness out of a rich 
human pluralism. In the next section, I turn to Murray’s understanding of 
religious pluralism and specifically, the question of religious freedom. In 
the final section, I will revisit his understanding of public consensus and 
relate it to contemporary debates on religious freedom and 
nondiscrimination, especially taking up the subject of an integral ecology 
of human rights and the preferential option for the poor and marginalized 
subjects. 
II.  JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND THE AMERICAN 
MODEL OF CHURCH AND STATE 
The constitutional affirmation of America as the one nation that exists 
under God and subsists within the pluralism of religious traditions leaves 
 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 106. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 107. 
39. Id. at 108. 
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a lasting mark in the Church’s Vatican II teaching on religious freedom, 
Dignitatis Humanae. Murray’s arguments on religious freedom can be 
traced to a series of articles published in the 1940s and 1950s in 
Theological Studies, a prominent theological American and Jesuit 
Journal.40 His teaching on this matter can be summarized as follows: All 
human persons are equal in dignity before God because all are 
independent, responsible, and autonomous creatures; human persons are 
the foundations and end of social life; religious freedom can be restricted 
where public peace or justice are threatened; all persons are equal under 
the law; and all social institutions, including governments, have a primary 
responsibility to support human dignity and freedom.41 
David Hollenbach, SJ argues that the claim that human persons act by 
their “own counsel and purpose, using and enjoying [their] freedom, 
moved, not by external coercion, but internally by the risk of [their] whole 
existence,” places the responsibility of becoming, of actualization of 
humanity, and of ethical decision-making, directly upon the conscience 
of individuals.42 No one—not God, government, or the Church—can 
substitute or undermine human responsibility.43 But, governments and 
social institutions have a duty to protect human dignity, freedom, and 
conscience. Hollenbach draws attention to the relationship between moral 
and juridical orders, quoting Murray who argues, “the juridical order 
 
40. See, e.g., John Courtney Murray, Current Theology: Freedom of Religion, 6 THEOLOGICAL 
STUD. 85, 85–113 (1945) (commenting on the influence global events have on the freedom of 
religion); John Courtney Murray, Freedom of Religion I: The Ethical Problem, 6 THEOLOGICAL 
STUD. 229, 229–86 (1945) (describing the ethical problem presented by the freedom of religion 
and applicable historic and theoretical approaches to that problem); John Courtney Murray, Current 
Theology: On Religious Freedom, 10 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 409, 409–32 (1949) (responding to 
articles “dealing with the urgent contemporary problem of religious freedom and the relations 
between Church and state”); John Courtney Murray, Leo XIII On Church and State: The General 
Structure of the Controversy, 14 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 1, 1–30 (1953) [hereinafter Leo XIII On 
Church and State] (outlining the “Leonine” documents “relevant to the problem of Church and 
State”); John Courtney Murray, Leo XIII: Separation of Church and State, 14 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 
145, 145–214 (1953) [hereinafter Leo XIII: Separation of Church and State] (describing how Pope 
Leo XIII understood the separation of Church and state as “both . . . an ideology and . . . a political 
and social program”); John Courtney Murray, Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government, 14 
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 551, 551–67 (1953) [hereinafter Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government] 
(indicating two concepts of government—political and paternal—and their interaction with 
religion); John Courtney Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 25 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 
503, 503–75 (1964) [hereinafter The Problem of Religious Freedom] (realizing the “differences 
among political traditions and regimes, and the divergences in the historical experiences of the 
nations,” and addressing “the more difficult problem of Christian communities in lands of non-
Christian tradition and culture”). 
41. David Hollenbach, Freedom and Truth: Religious Liberty as Immunity and Empowerment, 
in JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY & THE GROWTH OF TRADITION, supra note 21, at 129, 142–43. 
42. Id. at 141. 
43. Id. at 142. 
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cannot be sundered from the moral order, any more than the human 
person can be halved.”44 Thus, in dealing with the question of 
government and its obligation to respect human conscience, religious 
freedom, and human dignity, government cannot undermine the nature of 
persons as religious and as responsible selves. The “truth to which 
government is accountable is the truth of human dignity, the truth that in 
matters religious, as in all matters in which human beings’ very selves 
are determined.”45 Human persons must enjoy immunity from eternal 
coercion, and governments can only interfere where public peace and 
justice are threatened. 
Murray’s reflections on religious freedom also challenged the Roman 
Catholic claim of being the one true faith and sole possessor of the one 
religious truth. In this model, known as error has no right, truths in other 
religious traditions had little room to be recognized and no possibility of 
salvation outside this visible body (“Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus”).46 
Murray convinced the Church to move beyond this envisioned ideal, 
known as “Catholic Thesis,” which could never be realized in modern 
democratic states, and even beyond the more pragmatic approach of 
simply tolerating the status quo, known as the “Catholic Hypothesis.” 
Murray’s approach embraces the possibility of encountering truth, even 
religiously-constructed truths, within the “catholicity” of cultural and 
religious traditions and accepts religious pluralism as a matter of 
historical fact and value.47 There is little doubt that Murray’s ideas 
brought about a cultural shift in official Roman Catholic teaching. The 
American separation of Church and state and, in particular, the First 
Amendment, propelled his inspiration. 
Murray’s case for distinguishing Church from state, and state from 
society, followed Leo XIII’s distinguishing the temporal power of the 
state from the spiritual power of the Church, carried enormous 
implications for the Church’s understanding of the role of religion in the 
 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 143. 
46. See generally FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN, SALVATION OUTSIDE THE CHURCH?: TRACING THE 
HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC RESPONSE (Paulist Press 1992) (studying the history of Christian 
thought about the salvation of outsiders to determine whether the dogma that there is no truth 
outside the Church is a true Catholic dogma). 
47. On the pre-Vatican II views that came to be known as the Catholic Thesis-Hypothesis on 
religious freedom, see The Problem of Religious Freedom, supra note 40. See also MCCLORY, 
supra note 6, at 7–8 (describing the “Catholic Thesis” as the rigid supposition “that the vast 
majority (if not all) of the citizens of the state were Catholic,” and the “Catholic Hypothesis” as the 
pragmatic position Church authorities took in response to the fall of Catholic monarchs, advocating 
Church authorities in the eightenteenth and nineteenth centuries “tolerate non-Catholic states until 
such time as the Catholic population grew into the majority”).  
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public square within modern democracies.48 The American model of 
freedom from religion, rather than freedom of religion offered a particular 
and unique way of relating God and Caesar. Rather than excluding the 
church and religion from contributing to society, the American model 
offered the Catholic Church and other religious traditions “immunity” 
from government while also allowing the possibility for religion to 
contribute constructively to the common good. At this point, it is worth 
recalling the distinction that Murray makes between state and society, 
noting its relation to public order and the common good: 
The common good is the responsibility of all persons and institutions 
within society. It consists of the full range of conditions that facilitate 
human fulfillment. The state is responsible only for the public order, 
which consists of the conditions necessary for the mere coexistence of 
persons in society. . . . Murray enumerates three goods under the rubric 
of public order: public peace, public morality, and justice. Only when 
these are violated can the state justly intervene with its coercive 
powers.49 
Even more revolutionary than his arguments surrounding the 
separation of Church from state, was Murray’s affirmation of human 
dignity and human conscience, undoubtedly also influenced by 
inalienable and constitutionally enshrined rights in the United States. As 
Murray’s commentators have noted, the increased historical emphasis in 
his writings led to greater attention to the “exigencies” of human persons, 
including, but not limited to, human conscience and dignity. This carries 
great contemporary relevance.50 In arguing that individual persons have 
a God-given duty to freely exercise their consciences unencumbered by 
any form of external coercion, Murray not only challenged states to 
respect religious freedom and conscience, but indirectly, this focus on 
human conscience and religious freedom also challenges the Church to 
refrain from exercising any external coercion on its faithful citizens. 
More specifically, this focus on individual conscience challenges the 
Church to refrain from turning to the ministerial exception, an exception 
to nondiscrimination laws for religious institutions enshrined in United 
States law, as a way to justify external coercion.51 One need read no 
 
48. See Leo XIII On Church and State, supra note 40, at 1–30 (arguing “the struggle is between 
‘the church’ and ‘the sects,’” which are activist parties in search of political powers); Leo XIII: 
Separation of Church and State, supra note 40, at 145–214 (analyzing Leo XIII’s theory regarding 
the practice of “Church-State relationships amid the conditions created by the peculiar nineteenth-
century plight of the so-called Catholic nations of Europe and Latin America”); Leo XIII: Two 
Concepts of Government, supra note 40, at 551–67 (understanding the political and paternal 
concepts of government and their roles influencing the modern democracy). 
49. Whitmore, supra note 23, at 155. 
50. Id. at 161–71. 
51. The ministerial exception is an exception to discrimination laws for religious institutions 
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further than past the opening words of Dignitatis Humanae to witness the 
profound effect this historical shift to human conscience had on Church 
teaching and the value it still carries with respect to checking potential 
abuses that could come from the state, but also from religious institutions: 
A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself 
more and more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man, and 
the demand is increasingly made that men should act on their own 
judgment, enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not 
driven by coercion but motivated by a sense of duty.52 
III.  AN UNFINISHED PROJECT: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, PUBLIC CONSENSUS, 
AND THE AFFIRMATION OF HUMAN CONSCIENCES TODAY 
Embracing a profound realism and pluralism, Murray was convinced 
that context is decisive and that, as he said, “[i]f we are to interpret the 
world, as we must, even to itself, our first duty is to understand it, in 
detail, with full realism under abnegation of the easy generalities with 
which the world is ordinarily denounced.”53 In considering and 
interpreting the details of the world in its historical circumstances, 
Murray’s methodology invites us to examine the various cultural and 
diverse contexts that must now be taken into account to interpret and 
further develop the Church’s teaching on religious freedom. From this 
perspective, the recent irruption into history of various marginalized 
persons, which has carried enormous impact in the field of religious 
studies and theology, must also impact the field of law, its interpretation, 
and its implementation. These persons, faithful citizens that participate 
and contribute to both Church and society, have often experienced 
marginalization, discrimination, and human rights violations on the basis 
of their race, gender, sexual orientation, physical ability, immigration 
status, and the like.54 Their cry must be heard in order to justly interpret 
 
when they limit who may serve in positions within their place of worship. See Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012) (affirming the ministerial 
exception to discrimination laws). 
52. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 1, at para. 1. 
53. DONALD E. PELOTTE, JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY: THEOLOGIAN IN CONFLICT 17 (1976). 
54. The role religion has played in various forms of human oppression within the American 
continent has been amply explored. See, e.g., PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 
(2000); ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER, SEXISM AND GOD-TALK: TOWARD A FEMINIST 
THEOLOGY (1983); MARCELLA ALTHAUS-REID, INDECENT THEOLOGY: THEOLOGICAL 
PERVERSIONS IN SEX, GENDER AND POLITICS (2000); JAMES H. CONE, THE CROSS AND THE 
LYNCHING TREE (2011); UNCOMMON FAITHFULNESS: THE BLACK CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE (M. 
Shawn Copeland ed., 2009); NANCY L. EIESLAND, THE DISABLED GOD: TOWARD A LIBERATORY 
THEOLOGY OF DISABILITY (1994); JONATHAN Y. TAN, ASIAN AMERICAN THEOLOGIES (2008); 
FROM THE HEART OF OUR PEOPLE: LATINO/A EXPLORATIONS IN CATHOLIC SYSTEMATIC 
THEOLOGY (Orlando O. Espín & Miguel H. Díaz eds., 1999). 
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and implement the laws of our nation. This preferential option for the 
legally and religiously marginalized, if I may be allowed to coin this 
phrase, provides a new opportunity and a new public lens from which to 
build public consensus. Their views have often been unrepresented, 
underrepresented, or neglected in our courts. 
Since the late 1960s, individual Christian churches, other religious 
bodies, and, most recently, the Catholic Church in the figure of Pope 
Francis, have made a more conscientious effort to protect the 
marginalized and oppressed and defend their individual conscience and 
human dignity.55 Following this historical consciousness and embracing 
an integral ecology of human rights requires that we work to build bridges 
between advocates of religious freedom, on the one hand, and all other 
advocates of human rights on the other. This means that the entities of the 
state, the Church, and society, entities where voices of Catholics are often 
encountered, must work together for the benefit of all. 
The Catholic axiom affirming subsidiarity still holds within this newly 
acquired historical option for the marginalized: “as much religious 
freedom as possible; only as much restriction as necessary to protect the 
public order.”56 But an equally important, and sometimes neglected 
Catholic social teaching is also the principle of solidarity, especially 
solidarity with the “indecent,” the “lynched,” the “undocumented” of 
history—those who suffer marginalization.57 In situations where tensions 
arise between Church authorities and the law and in matters concerning 
persons who experience marginalization within the Church and society, 
the Church would be well served to follow the example of Murray who 
argued that Pope Pius XII’s teaching “goes much further [than affirming 
religious diversity] when he flatly states that ‘in certain circumstances 
God does not give men any mandate . . . to impede or to repress what is 
erroneous and false.’ The First Amendment is simply the legal 
enunciation of this papal statement.”58 
In this case, this mandate and the respect for religious freedom ought 
to apply ad intra with respect to the Church and its institutional exercise 
of religious freedom. 
Society’s concience related to fundamantal human rights associated 
with marginalized communities continues to grow and expand. At the 
 
55. On liberating theologies and their emergence in response to the cry of the “poor,” where 
being “poor” means human oppression in various manifestations, see generally MIGUEL A. DE LA 
TORRE, INTRODUCING LIBERATIVE THEOLOGIES (2015). 
56. See Hollenbach, supra note 41, at 143 (discussing this general principle in the context of 
religious liberty as empowerment). 
57. On the principle of subsidiary, see Gregorio Guitán, Juan XXIII y la encíclica Pacem in 
terris: La relación entre bien común y subsidiaridad, 46 SCRIPTA THEOLOGICA 381, 381–99 (2014). 
58. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 73–74. 
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same time, polarization seems to grow between advocates of religious 
freedom and those favoring nondiscrimination laws. Because of this 
dichotomy, there is today a great urgency to bridge the two sides and to 
use the defense of religious freedom as an opportunity to defend other 
basic human rights. The dismissal of LGBTQ persons from religiously 
affiliated institutions, including Catholic institutions, and recent court 
rulings in this area offer examples of how religious freedom and 
nondiscrimination principles have not achieved just resolution in 
American society.59 The Church is not a monolithic institution. Among 
other areas, there is great pluralism of religious experience and 
theological perspectives regarding the controversial debates surrounding 
human sexuality and reproductive rights.60 But this religious and 
theological diversity, which concerns the individual consciences of 
millions of Americans, has yet to make its impact on court rulings. 
Murray was able to see that the agent and bearer of political power was 
no longer the state, but now, that agency belonged to the citizen and 
Christian (civis idem et Christianus).61 But citizen-Christians come in 
great varieties, belong to different Christian churches and political 
parties, and differ with respect to their communally, ecclesially, socially, 
and religiously informed consciences. Notwithstanding this pluralism, all 
of them, as well as those who identify with other religious traditions, no 
religious tradition, and even those who are not citizens, deserve equal 
 
59. See, e.g., Collette v. Archdiocese of Chi., 200 F. Supp. 3d 730 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (ruling 
against a director of worship and music that claimed he was fired for intending to marry male 
partner); Duaa Eldeib, Court Rules Against Gay Man Who Sued Catholic Church Over Firing, CHI. 
TRIB. (June 8, 2017, 7:07 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-catholic-
church-gay-employee-lawsuit-met-20170607-story.html (dismissing claim of a man married to 
another man); Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., No. 1:16-CV-11576, 2017 WL 4339817 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2017) (finding in favor of the Church on an employment discrimination claim 
based on sexual orientation). See also Joy P. Waltemath, Ministerial Exception Nixes Married Gay 
Music Director’s Discriminatory Discharge Claims, EMP’T L. DAILY, http://www. 
employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/ministerial-exception-nixes-married-gay-music-
director-discriminatory-discharge-claims/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2018) (explaining the holding of 
Demkovich); Thorson v. Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass’n, 687 N.W.2d 652 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) 
(affirming the dismissal of claim by a woman arguing she was terminated because she was a 
lesbian); Doe v. Lutheran High Sch., 702 N.W.2d 322 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming the 
dismissal of an employment discrimination claim of a pastor and teacher arguing his religious high 
school fired him after he disclosed he was gay); Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church, 679 
N.W.2d 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (dismissing state human rights claims filed by a discharged 
bisexual music director).  
60. See generally CHARLES E. CURRAN, CATHOLIC MORAL THEOLOGY IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A HISTORY (2008). 
61. See Charles E. Curran, The Role of the Laity in the Thought of John Courtney Murray, in 
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY & THE GROWTH OF TRADITION, supra note 21, at 241, 250, 253 
(analyzing the state and human person as a dyarchy over the First Amendment and recognizing in 
the human person a spiritual power that stands above it). 
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protection under the law. State and religious institutions have an ethical 
obligation to respect the right of persons to assume responsibility for their 
self-actualization, guarding themselves against any form of external 
coercion. All citizens deserve the right to be protected against threats that 
undermine this God-given capacity to risk one’s whole existence in the 
process of self-actualization and becoming a creature alive for the greater 
glory of God (ad majorem Dei gloriam). 
The state must respect religious expressions and beliefs, and not just 
the freedom of worship. And the Church in turn needs to become ever 
more cognizant and respectful of the pluralism of its citizen-believers. 
While Murray would surely stand on the side of conscience, and yes, a 
conscience formed by the Church, our contemporary notions of Church 
are more complex, more historically informed, more dynamic, and more 
inclusive, moving beyond the institutional dimension.62 Perhaps more 
than ever before, the people of God, exercising their sensus fidelium, have 
informed their consciences with respect to issues of religion and religious 
freedom.63 Thus, within our historical context, it is not only the state that 
must be cautioned against interfering on matters of conscience, but, in 
some cases, religious institutions and their representatives must also be 
cautioned. Clearly, in defense of human dignity and conscience and 
against the abuse of religious freedom, the very document that Murray 
steered into official Church teaching, Dignitatis Humanae, affirms that 
society “has the right to defend itself against possible abuses committed 
on the pretext of freedom of religion. It is the special duty of government 
to provide this protection.”64 
While the Church certainly has much to contribute and teach the world, 
particularly with respect to human dignity and fundamental human rights, 
the Church, which exists in society, can also learn much from society.65 
A number of Murray’s followers might agree with me that all issues of 
discrimination, whether religious or cultural in nature, are matters of 
public order. They are also issues that the Church needs to persuasively 
 
62. See Avery Dulles’s classic work, AVERY CARDINAL DULLES, MODELS OF THE CHURCH 
(2002) (deriving six major approaches from the writings of contemporary Protestant and Catholic 
ecclesiologies). See also ORLANDO O. ESPÍN, IDOL & GRACE: ON TRADITIONING AND 
SUBVERSIVE HOPE (2014) (proposing a theological approach that draws out the subversive 
approach of the gospels and the role of the marginalized in passing along the Christian message). 
63. On the sensus fidelium, see ORLANDO O. ESPÍN, Tradition and Popular Religion: An 
Understanding of the Sensus Fidelium, in THE FAITH OF THE PEOPLE: THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 
ON POPULAR CATHOLICISM 63 (1997). 
64. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 1, para. 7. 
65. On human dignity, see Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church 
in the Modern World paras. 12–22 (Dec. 7, 1965), http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils 
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address within a pluralistic society. There is an urgent need for public 
consensus and just adjudication in legal processes concerning the defense 
of religious freedom, particularly where religious institutions are exempt 
from nondiscrimination laws that trump the exercise of individual 
conscience. 
Murray appealed to natural law as a way to argue for the renewal of 
the American public consensus.66 In the spirit of Murray, we need a new 
consensus that relies on an “ordering of reason,” as Thomas Aquinas 
would argue, but surely, a reasoning process deeply rooted in historical 
consciousness.67 A public consensus on issues of religious freedom and 
nondiscrimination must be built and developed, tapping into the common 
and shared wisdom of various Christian communities, of those belonging 
to other faiths, or to no faith at all. All are equal heirs to this American 
experience of honoring pluralism and fostering unity out of diversity, e 
pluribus unum.68 As Murray would envision, this public consensus 
should act as a check and balance within our democracy against any abuse 
of power—be it religious or secular in origin. And lastly, while an 
ordering of reason is essential in engaging a wide range of voices, 
perspectives, and opinions, compassion must be embraced as a way to 
temper polarizing and passionate conversations and agency on behalf of 
religious freedom and on behalf of other human rights. 
Religious leaders and advocates of religious freedom have been and 
can continue to be a powerful force for good in society. They contribute 
to construct public consensus when they stand on the side of individual 
conscience and freedom and when they put into practice what the Church 
teaches with respect to human rights and dignity, regardless of the issue 
at hand. Singling out LGBTQ persons within Catholic institutions as the 
only employees whose lives must be scrutinized weakens the Church’s 
credibility as a voice of justice, a community of love and compassion, 
and a builder of public consensus.69 As research evidences, “violations 
 
66. MURRAY, supra note 3. 
67. See Curran, supra note 3, at 253 (describing Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of natural 
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of religious freedom and agency both by governments and powerful 
social actors, tend to reinforce oppressive structures that marginalize, or 
prevent integration of, impoverished people, exploited women, migrants, 
ethnic and religious minorities and outcasts.”70 But the Church can 
undermine this fundamental human right when it relies on the ministerial 
exception as a way for religious institutions to dismiss individual persons 
whose views run counter to its official religious teachings. Within an 
integral ecology of rights, all human rights must be protected. 
We know from the recent and controversial ruling in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission that more conversations 
are needed in matters regarding faith and public order.71 At present, 
courts lack the ability to consider the diversity of religious perspectives 
within the Church and society. Appeals to the ministerial exception need 
to be carefully thought out so as not to endanger the value of human 
conscience. Because legal precedent favors religious institutions and not 
individual religious persons, the court’s major rulings so far leave little 
room to honor the religious and dissenting views of individuals, their 
religious freedom, and their consciences. Change must occur if we are to 
embrace the option for the legally and religiously marginalized. This 
difficult and oftentimes polarizing subject must be navigated within the 
courts, especially when defending the religious freedom associated with 
religious institutions comes into conflict with defending other legally 
recognized human rights associated with marginalized voices and 
communities. 
This dilemma requires well-reasoned and compassionate voices to 
address the following questions: Whose conscience prevails when 
tensions between religious and social values ensue? Is it the 
institutionalized conscience related to the religious body represented by 
its official leaders, the informed conscience of individuals shaped by 
religious and/or socio-political perspectives, or the conscience of 
democratically elected political bodies and its leaders charged with 
preserving the common good? Are the courts obliged by legal precedent 
to take the side of the religious freedom of the institution or does our legal 
system provide room to find ways to protect the religious freedom of 
individuals in the spirit of John Courtney Murray with respect to official 
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Roman Catholic teaching on religious freedom? How can the common 
good best be served when tensions between religion, state, or any group 
within society occur? And how can the constitutional rights of all human 
persons within a democracy be protected, even while balancing 
institutionally religious and individually religious held values? 
In transitioning from “error has no rights” to only people—not ideas—
have rights, Murray set into motion a religious ethos and teaching that 
has yet to be fully realized.72 Perhaps the time has come to consider, 
without losing sight of the social and relational nature of human persons, 
when institutional religious rights need to be legally checked in favor of 
particular subjects to prevent the erosion of the very religious values and 
freedom of conscience that these institutions rightly engendered and 
defend within society. Faithful to American democracy, the courts must 
continue to rule in favor of upholding the Church’s religious self-
expression. In turn, faithfulness to its teaching on religious freedom and 
conscience requires that the Church and state both deepen their 
understanding of our historical moment and expand support for all 
Christian citizens and all women and men of good will. In continuity with 
John Courtney Murray’s teaching on religious freedom, the Church and 
the courts might do well to work together to safeguard the freedom of 
individual conscience and thereby build public consensus around the 
defense of universal human dignity and human rights. 
As significant as the Catholic Church’s teaching in Dignitatis 
Humanae was, this teaching remains an unfinished project. The Church’s 
teaching on religious freedom must necessarily continue to be updated as 
it engages in historically situated conversations related to human rights 
and dignity. If the Church—institutionally speaking from the level of 
international relations or locally speaking from the perspective of any 
given democracy like ours—is to be judged as a credible and valuable 
religious voice in the conversation about human rights issues, respected 
in its right to freely express its religious convictions as an institution, and 
an equal partner in the construction of the common good, it must be 
willing not only to share with the world its religious wisdom as an “expert 
humanity.” Its leaders must also be willing to receive and deepen this 
understanding of humanity by engaging the world and people’s concrete 
realities, whether these individuals come from the faithful or from the 
world that shapes the Church’s existence. Just like it embraced worldly 
and American wisdom in Dignitatis Humanae, the Church can continue 
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to dialogue with our particular cultural and American values so as to 
deepen its own religious consciousness and its advocacy on behalf of 
human rights and the dignity of all persons.73 
As the United States ambassador to the Holy See, I witnessed the 
tensions that often emerged between religiously and socio-politically 
motivated values in efforts to defend basic human dignity, human rights, 
and religious freedom of various communities, especially for the tens of 
thousands of Christians and members of other minority groups that have 
been displaced from their lands as a result war and violence. The same 
appeal to religious freedom, human rights, and conscience that diplomats 
invoke at the international relations level applies at the level of national 
relations in efforts to defend underrepresented and marginalized 
communities. If Murray teaches us anything, it is that even men and 
women who disagree with the official teaching of the Church on any 
given issue can still love the Church enough to change its teaching for the 
sake of advancing the dignity of all.74 Making space for difference, 
domestically and internationally, is a worthy civic cause and a God-given 
call to build public consensus around issues that concern the common 
good.75 
A Christian’s first duty is to seek and act upon God’s liberating grace, 
whether that grace is found within the Church, within society, or, even 
more basically, within the wisdom of daily living offered through 
countless men and women who struggle on behalf of human rights and 
dignity. The end of the human being and its achievement, as Murray 
rightly argued, is transcendent and supernatural, but this achievement is 
truly a human achievement.76 Quoting Aquinas, Murray argues, “Grace 
perfects nature, does not destroy it.”77 Indeed, because grace grows in 
history, Christ’s body is “a-building here in time.”78 
Murray’s words offer the Church a powerful reminder that defending 
human dignity with respect to any human person or community within 
our democracy is never an action contrary to the mission of the Church. 
 
73. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 1. 
74. See MCCLORY, supra note 6, at 26 (comparing Murray with Galileo, recognizing “Galileo 
is very much in the tradition of other responsible dissenters: those who tried to open questions that 
appeared to have been settled long ago, who sought to do so without contradicting the foundations 
of religious faith, and who in the process made sacrifices”). 
75. See JONATHAN SACKS, THE DIGNITY OF DIFFERENCE: HOW TO AVOID THE CLASH OF 
CIVILIZATIONS 53 (2002) (“God, the creator of humanity, having made a covenant with all 
humanity, then turns to one people and commands it to be different in order to teach humanity the 
dignity of difference.”). 
76. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 176–77. 
77. Id. at 176. 
78. Id. at 177 (emphasis added). 
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Understood from Christian and Thomistic theological perspectives, the 
social challenges we face are not simply concerns of the state but are also 
issues that concern faith and the development of doctrine. Building peace 
and public order is in full continuity with the ethical demands of building 
Christ’s body. The business of the public square is the business of the 
Church. Our central task today is “to consider the question of religious 
freedom from a different perspective, to ask the questions about it in a 
different way and by taking into consideration different premises and new 
circumstances.”79 In so doing, we might remain faithful to Murray’s 
methodology, allowing public consensus to build between advocates of 
religious freedom and advocates of nondiscrimination laws so as to 
advance an integral ecology of human rights. 
Therefore, we pay tribute to Murray best not by repeating his answers—
that would entail the four doctrinal fallacies of fixism, archaism, 
misplaced abstractness and anachronism—but by raising again his 
question: what are the exigences of human dignity—particularly 
regarding the religious dimension of the person—given present 
circumstances?80 
CONCLUSION 
When Father Vincent McCormick, who was acting upon orders from 
the Holy Office, delivered the blow to Murray that he was being silenced, 
Father McCormick said, “I suppose you may write poetry. Between 
harmless poetry and Church-State problems, what fields are taboo I don’t 
know.” As a way to maintain the link between the exercise of religious 
freedom and the exercise of human conscience and to draw attention to 
our historical moment and the preferential option for the poor and 
marginalized, I will end my reflections with a poem written by Reinaldo 
Arenas. Arenas was a Cuban exile in the United States who devoted much 
of his energy to writing “harmless” poems that equally challenged various 
faces of human oppression and lifted the consciousness of various 
marginalized persons and communities. He suffered from AIDS and died 
on December 7, 1990. In his poem entitled Niño Viejo (Old Child), he 
reminds us of the marginalized and forgotten child that lives in our midst 
whose fundamental human dignity deserves to be recognized. Upholding 
human conscience and dignity is truly the business of the laws in our land 
and the business of any religion, including the Roman Catholic Church: 
I am that child with the round, dirty face 
who on every corner bothers you with his 
“can you spare a quarter?” 
 
 
79. HUDOCK, supra note 5, at 172. 
80. Whitmore, supra note 23, at 171. 
2018] An Unfinished Project 23 
I am that child with the dirty face 
no doubt unwanted 
that from far away contemplates coaches 
where other children 
emit laughter and jump up and down considerably 
 
I am that unlikeable child 
definitely unwanted 
with the round dirty face 
who before the giant street lights or 
under the grandames also illuminated 
or in front of the little girls that seem to levitate 
projects the insult of his dirty face 
 
I am that angry and lonely child of always, 
that throws you the insult of that angry child of always 
and warns you: 
if hypocritically you pat me on the head 
I would take that opportunity to steal your wallet. 
 
I am that child of always 
before the panorama of imminent terror, 
imminent leprosy, imminent fleas, 
of offenses and the imminent crime. 
I am that repulsive child that improvises a bed 
out of an old cardboard box and waits, 
certain that you will accompany me.81 
 
 
81. Reinaldo Arenas, My Lover the Sea, POEMHUNTER.COM, https://www.poemhunter.com 
/poem/my-lover-the-sea-2/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).  
